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A reliable supply of electricity is critical for our modern society and any large scale disturbance of the electrical system
causes substantial costs. In 2015, one overloaded transmission line caused a cascading failure in the Turkish power grid,
affecting about 75 million people. Here, we analyze the Turkish power grid and its dynamical and statistical properties.
Specifically, we propose, for the first time, a model that incorporates the dynamical properties and the complex network
topology of the Turkish power grid to investigate cascading failures. We find that the network damage depends on
the load and generation distribution in the network with centralized generation being more susceptible to failures than
a decentralized one. Furthermore, economic considerations on transmission line capacity are shown to conflict with
stability.
Cascading failures in power grids are the main cause of
large-scale blackouts, which cause large economic and so-
cial costs. Previous studies mainly modeled cascades as
a sequence of steady states, employing mostly static anal-
ysis. However, real-world cascading failures often com-
mence within short time scales such as few minutes or even
seconds, rendering static analysis inappropriate. Here, we
focus on the Turkish power grid, which experienced a ma-
jor blackout in 2015. We extract the Turkish power grid
topology from Transmission System Operator (TSO) data
and introduce a framework to describe dynamical cascad-
ing failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are surrounded by natural or man-made networks, either
technologically or sociologically that directly or indirectly af-
fect human beings and are studied extensively as complex
systems1,2. Many advancements of our modern society rely on
a stable electricity supply and thereby on the network of elec-
trical power grids. Examples range from medical care to long-
distance transportation, instant communication or industrial
automation, most of which break down without electricity3.
Therefore, we can clearly identify the electrical supply system
as uniquely critical4. Any large scale outage will cause high
economic costs and potentially threaten the political stability
of a region5.
The electricity system is based on a high-voltage alternat-
ing current (AC) network, the power grid. This electrical grid
cannot store any energy in itself6, in contrast to, for example,
the gas network7. Instead, supply and demand have to be bal-
anced at all times. Any imbalance will cause a shift of the
power grid’s frequency away from the reference of 50 Hz (or
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60 Hz in the Americas and parts of South-East Asia). A short-
age of generation reduces the frequency and an abundance of
generation increases the frequency, speeding up the turbines
at the connected power plants8. Any large deviation from the
reference frequency will cause disconnection of loads (load
shedding) and shutdown of power plants, either to keep the
grid stable or to protect the machines8. Simultaneously, trans-
mission lines are protected by automatic shut-down mecha-
nisms, which disconnect the line if the load on the line exceeds
a given security threshold, i.e., the line trips.
Cascading failures are sequences of events where the dis-
ruption of a single element causes a global breakdown (black-
out) of the system9–12. Suppose a single element of the power
grid fails, e.g. a large generator has to shut down, a major
load is disconnected or an important transmission line is lost.
The removal of this one element then induces a disturbance in
most of the remaining network elements. In the worst case,
this disruption triggers a domino-like cascade of errors where
additional lines become overloaded and trip and also genera-
tors have to disconnect13.
Despite the overall improvements in supply security, we are
still facing multiple major blackouts worldwide every decade.
Constraining ourselves to major power blackouts that affected
more than twenty million people at least, we obtain the fol-
lowing list: Venezuelan 2019 (30 millions), Sri Lanka 2016
(21 millions), Kenya 2016 (44 millions), Turkey 2015 (75
millions), Pakistan 2015 (140 millions), Bangladesh 2014
(150 millions), India 2012 (620 millions), Indonesia 2005
(100 millions), United States-Canada 2003 (55 millions),
Italy-Switzerland 2003, (55 millions), Philippines 2002, (40
millions), India 2001 (230 millions), Philippines 2001, (35
millions)14. One of the more recent extreme events in this list
is the major power blackout of Turkey in 2015 that affected the
entire population of the country, not only parts of the country,
like some of the other examples.
Turkey’s geography is quite unique with major cities in
its Western European region, while a large area of its land
is also on the Asian continent. Due to this prominent geo-
graphical feature, the relationship between power subsystems
of the Western and Eastern parts of Turkey also corresponds
2to an obvious intercontinental link between Europe and Asia
as well. Turkey’s power grid is connected to the Continental
European power grid, operated by the ENTSO-E (European
Network of Transmission System Operators) and experienced
a major blackout in 2015. Contrary to cascading events in
Europe in 2003 and 20065,15, this contingency was limited to
Turkey and did not spread to the remaining ENTSO-E grid
as the transmission lines between the Turkish and the remain-
ing European grid were disconnected. Interestingly, very few
studies have investigated the blackout and the cascading fail-
ure in Turkey in 201516,17. Hence, we briefly summarize the
sequence of events, which left about 75 million people with-
out electrical power18,19:
On 31st March 2015, preceding its largest power outage in
recent history, Turkey’s main generation and main demand re-
gions were spatially separated. Due to large amounts of water
flowing through the hydro power plants in the Eastern parts of
Turkey, most power plants in the West were generating very
little electricity. Simultaneously, the large cities in the West,
such as Izmir and Istanbul had a large demand for electricity to
operate industrial and household applications. Therefore, the
lines connecting the East and the West were heavily loaded.
During the morning, one line connecting both regions tripped
as it became overloaded. Consequentially, the flow from East
to West was re-routed on other East-West connections, which
then also became overloaded. Thereby, the Western grid com-
pletely disconnected from the Eastern one and lost about 4.7
GW of power, missing approximately 20% of the necessary
power to fulfill the current demand20. This shortage of power
resulted in a rapid drop of the Western grid’s frequency. Loads
were disconnected to stabilize the grid. Still, several gen-
erators started to trip and therefore continued to destabilize
the grid. After about 10 seconds, the Western system fully
collapsed20. Simultaneously, the Eastern grid had a consid-
erable surplus of electricity generation, resulting in a similar
loss of synchrony and thereby a simultaneous collapse within
seconds.
A dynamical description of the power grid is necessary to
capture the brief time scale of seconds that passed from the
initial failure until a full collapse of the grid. Fortunately,
the interest in modelling power grids dynamically has risen
substantially in recent years21–28. Similarly, cascading fail-
ures have been studied intensively in statistical physics and
engineering29–41. Still, combining the two approaches, i.e,
using a dynamical framework for cascading failure analysis is
still rare but received additional support very recently29,42–45.
Here, we first extract an approximate representation of the
Turkish power grid topology. We then introduce our dynami-
cal framework for the short time scale dynamics of cascading
failures, which is based on the swing equation. Next, we anal-
yse the Turkish grid topology using this framework to find
decentralized generator distributions slightly more favourable
than centralized ones. Finally, we point out how economic op-
timization and grid resilience compete when considering net-
work extensions.
II. THE TURKISH GRID
We require a network representation of the Turkish power
grid to investigate and analyze any (dynamical) phenomenon,
such as the blackout that occurred in 2015. Therefore, we ex-
tract the approximate topology using publicly available data
from the report on the blackout by ENTSO-E20 and the inter-
active ENTSO-E map46. The maps mark the position of sub-
stations, which we treat as the nodes of the Turkish network,
and transmission lines, which form the edges of the Turkish
grid. Details of the line parameters or the precise demand
and generation at each node are not available to us. For our
dynamical model below, we will assume different random re-
alizations to model the various states of the grid. Considering
multiple scenarios grants deeper insight into the power grid’s
behavior as demand and generation distribution will typically
be different in summer than in winter, similarly as night de-
mand profiles differ from ones during the day47.
Inspecting the extracted Turkish power grid, we notice a
large cluster of substations close to the highly populated re-
gions, e.g. close to Istanbul in the North-West of Turkey, see
Fig. 1. In contrast, the central and Eastern parts of Turkey are
less populated and also have fewer substations. These subjec-
tive observations are backed-up by network measures48: With
N= 127 nodes and |E|=174 edges the Turkish grid topology is
a sparse network with a highly connected and highly clustered
community in the North-West and a very sparse and almost
tree-like structure to the East.
The extracted topology, including the names of the substa-
tions and their approximate positions, is freely available for
download, see Appendix: Methods. With the grid topology
available, we formulate the dynamical model determining the
state of each node (substation) in the next section.
III. A DYNAMICAL POWER GRID MODEL
To model line failures within the time scale of seconds, we
formulate a dynamical model capturing the essential proper-
ties of the power grid dynamics. Each node in our approxi-
mation of the Turkish grid is a substation in the high voltage
transmission grid. Modelling all underlying voltage struc-
tures, machines and devices would result in a very complex
model, which would not allow easy structural and analytical
insights. Therefore, we will focus on the transmission level
of the power grid and make a couple of simplifying assump-
tions: Since the voltage on the transmission lines is typically
between 220 and 380 kV, we neglect any ohmic losses and
reactive power, thereby we only consider active power trans-
mission. The voltage amplitude is assumed to be constant as
well. Furthermore, we aggregate all consumers and generators
connected to each substation into one effective synchronous
machine. This machine acts as an effective generator on the
transmission grid if it is connected to many generators, e.g.
hydro or fossil fuel plants. Contrary, nodes in urban areas will
often act as effective consumers.
Mathematically, we make use of the well-known swing
equation8,27,49. Each node i ∈ {1, ...,N} is then described by
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FIG. 1. Approximate topology of the Turkish power grid, based on ENTSO-E data20. The grid has many connections and substations
close to its major cities in the West (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir etc). In contrast, the more sparsely populated Eastern part is dominated by hydro
power plants and long-distance transmission lines.
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FIG. 2. Following an initial failure, the flow of few critical lines
exceeds a threshold. We display the flows along 5 lines representa-
tive for the flows in the network. The initial conditions of the simu-
lation use the fixed point of the original full network. Then, we let
the most heavily loaded line trip, resulting in a dynamical transition
towards a new fixed point. This transition involves large transient
power flows on several lines, which might violate security thresholds
α dynamically, while most line flows remain uncritical.
its deviation from the reference or mains frequency fR = 50
Hz or 60 Hz. We express the deviation in terms of the angular
velocity ωi = 2pi ( fi− fR) in the rotating frame, i.e., ωi = 0 is
equivalent to a frequency of fi = 50 Hz (or 60 Hz).
The other state variable of each node is the voltage phase
angle θi, which crucially determines the power flow between
two nodes. Overall the swing equation can be expressed as
follows
d
dt
θi = ωi, (1)
d
dt
ωi = Pi− γωi+
N
∑
j=1
Ki j sin(θ j−θi) , (2)
with effective power Pi (positive for generators and negative
for consumers), damping constant γi and coupling
Ki j = Bi jViVj, (3)
where Bi j is the susceptance between two nodes and Vi is
the voltage amplitude6. We often use homogeneous coupling
Ki j = KAi j with an unweighted adjacency matrix Ai j and then
only need to fix the coupling constant K. Note that high volt-
age transmission lines use three-phase currents, while we are
using a simplified single-phase calculation that assumes all
three phases to be symmetrical.
In its steady state or fixed point, all angles θi are constant
and all angular velocities ωi are zero. Contrary, if the system
is undergoing a perturbation, e.g. the loss of a transmission
line, the dynamical nature of the system becomes clear.
Let us consider the Turkish grid to rest at its stable state
and suddenly a line is lost, e.g. due to an overload, a light-
ening strike or similar. Then, the flows Fi j on many lines
will change. Especially, if the lost line was carrying a large
current, changes will be substantial. While some flows stay
almost constant or decrease, other lines will have to carry
the flow of the lost line. Eventually, the system might set-
tle down at a new fixed point but in the transition period from
one steady state to the next one, overload criteria on the trans-
mission lines might be exceeded, see Fig. 2.
We link the dynamical swing equation with considerations
of cascading failures as follows. Throughout all simulations,
4we track the relative flow F(t), given by
Fi j(t) = sin(θ j(t)−θi(t)) (4)
as a function of time. Most transmission lines will be dis-
connected automatically if they exceed a security threshold
α9,10. We will be strict in our security measures and assume
a line (i, j) is disconnected as soon as Fi j(t) > α . Note that
Fi j gives the relative fraction of maximal power flow along a
line, which would be reached if sin(θ j(t)−θi(t)) = 1. The
threshold α = 0.5 means that a line is assumed to overload if
it is transmitting 50% of this maximal load, regardless of its
absolute physical capacity.
Our simulations work as follows: Without knowledge of the
precise distribution of generation and consumption through-
out the network, we assume randomly distributed generators
and consumers so that the total generation matches the total
consumption. We consider three different scenarios using the
same grid topology as introduced in Section II:
First, we consider many small distributed generators and
consumers with a total of 63 consumers with consumption
PCon = −1s−2 and 64 generators with generation PGen =
63
64 s
−2 ≈ 1s−2. We use homogeneous coupling of K = 4.5s−2
on all lines.
Secondly, we model a more centralized generation pattern
with fewer generators, namely 18 generators with PGen =
109
18 s
−2 ≈ 6s−2. The remaining 109 nodes are consumers, still
with PCon = −1s−2. This centralized power distribution re-
quires a larger coupling K to reach its stable state37. Hence,
we use a homogeneous coupling of K = 12s−2.
Finally, we emulate a more economical investment into the
grid infrastructure. We initiate the grid at the same parame-
ters as in the first case, i.e., homogeneous coupling and many
small generators. Then, we change the coupling Ki j on all
lines so that it is approximately twice as large as the relative
flow Fi j. Since a change in the network coupling Ki j changes
the flows Fi j, we iterate this procedure a couple of times un-
til most lines carry about 50% of their maximum capacity.
We call this case heterogeneous coupling since all lines might
have a different coupling constant Ki j. See also44 for details
and Appendix:Methods for a link to the applied coupling ma-
trix. Note that these heterogeneties are on the network topol-
ogy level, i.e. different edges now have different properties.
These are still synthetic transmission line values and each in-
dividual line in itself is considered physically homogeneous
and we also still assume that the three-phase voltage can be
simplified as a single-phase voltage.
Before we started the simulations, we prepared each net-
work in its fixed point. At t = 1 second, we remove one trigger
line (a,b) from the network. Then, we update the flows Fi j(t)
over time and cut other lines as soon as their flow exceeds
the threshold Fi j > α . We consider all lines in the network
as potential trigger lines. The threshold α is chosen so that at
the fixed point and time t = 0 seconds no line is overloaded,
i.e. Fi j(0) < α on all lines (i, j). Cascade computations are
done for up to 50 seconds of simulation time, during which all
observed cascades terminated.
IV. CASCADING FAILURES IN THE TURKISH POWER
GRID
We now apply the dynamical cascading framework to in-
vestigate the statistical properties of cascading failures in the
Turkish grid topology. We start by asking: How many lines
will fail if one random line were to trip? We answer this ques-
tion in a structured way by considering all lines in the network
as a potential trigger line (a,b). Then, we record how many
lines did fail at the end of each simulation and compare two
different tolerances α . Aggregating the results for all trigger
lines yields a histogram of the number of line failures, see
Fig. 3.
For a given network, a higher tolerance α reduces the
expected damage on the network substantially. While for
α1 = 0.52 the decentralized power topology can have cascad-
ing events with up to 45 failed lines, a higher tolerance of
α2 = 0.7 restricts the maximum network damage to approxi-
mately 5 lines (Fig. 3 a). We observe a very similar behavior
of decreasing network damage with increasing tolerance for
centralized power and heterogeneous coupling (Fig. 3 b & c).
Interestingly, we do note that especially for homogeneous
coupling many lines do not cause any cascade (Fig. 3 a & b),
and the most likely case is to observe 1 line failure, i.e., only
the trigger line (a,b) failed. Contrary, heterogeneous coupling
results in many large cascades, even for the higher tolerance
of α2 = 0.7 many lines cause cascades of 75 failures or more
(Fig. 3 c).
To understand the different cascade responses in more de-
tail, we investigate the number of line failures as a function
of time in Fig. 4. We compare two different trigger lines
as highlighted in Fig. 4 a and record the aggregated number
of line failures over time for the decentralized, homogeneous
coupling (Fig. 4 b) and the heterogeneous coupling (Fig. 4
c). Again, we notice that the heterogeneous coupling results
in many more line failures than the decentralized setting. Af-
ter a brief period of a few seconds with no or few failures,
the system experiences a large number of contingencies until
either most lines already tripped or the grid eventually stabi-
lizes so that no further lines are lost. While line 1 does not
lead to any secondary line failures beyond the trigger line fail-
ure, line 2 causes large damage in the heterogeneous case, see
Fig. 4 c. The cascading events in Turkey in 2015 were likely
set in motion by a failure of such a "line 2", i.e., a line critical
for the operation of the stable state either because it is car-
rying a large load or because alternative rerouting pathways
are already highly loaded50. This also emphasizes that some
lines are critical for the network’s operation while the failure
of other lines can be more easily compensated.
Why do heterogeneously coupled grids display such large
cascades? To answer this, we compare the flow distribution
of the homogeneously and the heterogeneously coupled grids
at their respective fixed points in Fig. 5. By construction, the
heterogeneous coupling has many lines with a relative load of
F ≈ 0.5 and lines with very low absolute load are likely not es-
sential to operate the grid. Contrary, the homogeneously cou-
pled grid has many lines with low load because the coupling
on all lines has to be increased so that the highest loaded line
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FIG. 3. Heterogeneous coupling leads to many outages. We consider each line of the graph as a trigger line and then record the number
of lines failures. While some lines lead to no additional failures, others lead to many line failures. This histograms give the probability for
a certain number of lines to fail when randomly choosing an initial trigger line in the different network configurations. The total number of
edges and thereby maximum damage is |E|=174. (a): Many small distributed generators, with homogeneous coupling K = 4.5s−2, lead to
mostly small cascades. (b): Fewer, but larger generators, also with homogeneous coupling K = 12s−2, show similar statistics. (c): Same power
distribution as in (a) but using heterogeneous coupling so that Fi j ≈ 0.5 on all lines. This results in the largest cascading failures.
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FIG. 4. The expected network damage highly depends on the position of the initial failure. (a): We consider the Turkish power grid
topology with randomly placed generators (green squares) and consumers (red circles) with power P ≈ ±1s−2. Following two scenarios,
we either cut line 1 (orange) or line 2 (blue). (b): Depending on which line failed, a different number of total failures is recorded in the
homogeneously coupled grid. (c): The position of the initial failure is particularly important for the statistics of the heterogeneously coupled
grid. While line 1 results in almost no failures, an initial failure of line 2 results in a complete collapse of the grid. Furthermore, the number
of failures of an individual event and the average number of failures (green) is much higher than in the homogeneous case. Note that we only
display failures up to 20 seconds, at which point most cascades terminated. To not miss any later events, we simulate until 50 seconds.
is still within security margins. Thereby, the homogeneously
coupled grid is more robust with respect to line failures as its
lines carry a lower average flow of
〈
FHomo. coupling
〉 ≈ 0.15,
compared to
〈
FHetero. coupling
〉 ≈ 0.4 of the heterogeneously
coupled grid.
However, the high robustness of the homogeneously cou-
pled grid is expensive. The total coupling necessary, i.e.
||K|| = 12 ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1Ki j, is about 3 times larger in the homo-
geneous case than in the heterogeneous case. This intuitively
makes sense as the total power transmitted PTrans. within the
network should be about the same between the two cases. This
transmitted power is given approximately as the product of the
coupling and the relative flow PTrans.≈ ||K|| 〈F〉. We conclude
that robustness has to be paid by investments into the grid in-
frastructure.
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FIG. 5. The heterogeneously coupled grid has more highly-loaded lines. We display the probability density function (PDF) for all lines in
the network to have a certain initial load Fi j(0) = |sin(θ j(0)−θi(0))|, where the angles θ(0) are fixed point solutions of the swing equation (1).
The homogeneously coupled grid (a) has many lines with very small loads, while the heterogeneously coupled grid (b) has many highly-loaded
lines.
V. DISCUSSION
Motivated by the fast time scale of the Turkish blackout
in 2015, we have introduced a dynamical description of cas-
cading failures. We have extracted an approximation of the
Turkish power grid’s topology based on data from the trans-
mission system operators20,46. Furthermore, we discussed the
swing equation as a means to model the short time scale of the
power grid dynamics and presented a framework for cascad-
ing failures44.
Crucially, both the network topology and the simulation
framework are available for download and further usage, see
the link in the Appendix: Methods. Thereby, we offer a tool
for other scientists to investigate additional questions related
to the Turkish grid or any instance of cascading failures in any
power grid. The Turkish power grid is of special interest as it
bridges Europe and Asia and a failure within the Turkish grid
disconnects the Continental interconnection. Also, the tech-
nique presented here44 may be used to understand other major
power blackouts by investigating the impact of network struc-
ture and dynamical characteristics of the power grids on the
blackout dynamics.
For the Turkish case, we found that whether a specific line
failure will cause no, a small or a large-scale cascade de-
pends critically on the distribution of generation and demand
as well as on the line properties throughout the network. We
highlighted this by comparing centralized and decentralized
generation schema as well as considering heterogeneous cou-
pling. Interestingly, the distribution of generation and demand
within a given grid is not static but changes over time, e.g. due
to seasonal changes, night and day differences etc.47. Even
cultural routines and geographical properties of the regions
may effect the distribution of generation and demand of the
power grid, e.g. based on cooking habits, air condition usage
etc. Consequently, the resilience of the grid has to be moni-
tored continuously, as it is done in modern power grids8. Our
contribution of the dynamical framework44 could be a start-
ing point for dynamical properties to be integrated into the
monitoring. Furthermore, weighting resilience with respect to
cascading failures has to be balanced with economic consider-
ations, as we have shown in Fig. 5. Investing in few strategi-
cally important lines may lead to larger cascades than a more
spread out investment in transmission lines. Still, the former
is considerably cheaper and more likely to be accepted by lo-
cal communities51. These economic and social considerations
further add to previous insights that not every added transmis-
sion lines is necessarily beneficial for the grid’s stability52,53.
Our dynamical framework is based on the swing
equation6,49 with several simplifications (e.g. constant volt-
age amplitude, no ohmic losses or reactive power transmis-
sion). We believe these simplifications are justified in order
to have access to the dynamical properties and to allow (semi-
)analytical investigations, e.g. to predict critical lines44 or ob-
serve propagation patterns. Tools for more detailed analysis of
power systems already exist54,55 but only allow specific case
studies instead of a systematic investigation.
Many aspects of cascading failures are still not fully ex-
plored. The most pressing question would be how to miti-
gate cascading failures. If we were to anticipate the fast tran-
sient events, could we disconnect specific regions of the grid
to enable a steady operation of the remaining grid? Can we
identify topologies and generation patterns that are more ro-
bust than others? In addition, we could expand our cascading
framework to explicitly allow generators connected to substa-
tions to disconnect, thereby changing the node properties dy-
namically without altering the network topology. Finally, real
power grids are very heterogeneous systems and these hetero-
geneous properties heavily influence stability properties56 and
could even reduce overload risks57. An interesting and ideal
future project would be to test our predictions by using real
node and edge properties.
7ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
B. Schäfer gratefully acknowledges support from the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF grant no.
03SF0472A-F and 03EK3055F) and the German Science
Foundation (DFG) by a grant toward the Cluster of Excellence
“Center for Advancing Electronics Dresden” (cfaed). This
project has received funding from the European Union’s Hori-
zon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 840825. G. C. Yalcin
was supported by the Scientific Research Projects Coordina-
tion Unit of Istanbul University with project number 32990.
G. C. Yalcin also gratefully acknowledges to the Asian Net-
work of Complexity Scientists (ANCS), Complexity Institute,
Nanyang Technological University.
Appendix: Methods
The details of the simulations, including all network param-
eters, topology of the Turkish grid and simulation examples
are available at https://osf.io/gd5xn/.
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